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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCING THE STUDY 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades, the world has evolved to an e-era, wherein internet and other digital 
technologies have become key platforms for the world population, including Ugandans, to 
enjoy their rights of expression, to associate with other citizens and to engage with leaders. 
According to the Uganda Communications Commission, the number of internet users is 
growing steadily, standing at 13 023 114 as of March 2017 and encompassing 31.3% of the 
population.1 However, like other countries across the globe, Uganda is experiencing challenges 
to the advancement of privacy and freedom of expression online.2 According to the United 
Nations, these challenges affect how ordinary citizens, the media, human rights activists and 
political parties communicate via digital technologies.3 A key challenge is cybercrime. Ugandans 
lose colossal sums of money4 and even human life through cybercrime. 
The government of Uganda, in a bid to avert cybercrime, has enhanced cyber security, 
improved access to information and regulated telecommunications. They include the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2002, the National Information Technology Authority Uganda Act of 2009, the 
Regulation of Interception of Communications Act of 2010, the Electronic Signatures Act of 
2011, the Computer Misuse Act of 2011, the Electronic Transactions Act of 2011, the Uganda 
Communications Act of 2013, the Anti-Pornography Act of 2014 and the Evidence Act Cap 6 of 
1909. 
However, these laws contain ambiguous, imprecise, sweeping and confusing provisions 
that have the potential gravely to affect the enjoyment of rights. Some of these laws negate the 
full online enjoyment of cyber space. Whereas the government is allowed to limit the 
1 Uganda Communications Commission (2017) at 1. 
2 The Uganda Police Annual Crime and Road Safety Report (2017) at 10. 
3 UNGA Resolution No 64/211 on the Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity and Taking Stock of 
National Efforts to Protect Critical Information Infrastructures (2009) at 1 & 4. 
4 Tumushabe & Baryamureba (2005) at 15. 
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enjoyment of freedoms, the restrictions must be defined narrowly and should conform to the 
international standards to which Uganda subscribes.5 
The existing legal cyber framework of Uganda falls short of these standards. The 
government has acknowledged that it has very weak legislation relating to the cyber space 
industry.6 Laws related to intellectual property rights, data security, privacy, data protection 
and cybercrimes, where they exist, are still in their infancy and enforcement is still low, while 
other laws are outdated.7 
Further, the cyber-related laws in existence pose a grievous threat to the rights of the 
citizenry, with the rights most significantly affected being freedom of expression and the right 
to privacy. Some of these laws are dedicated cyber laws aimed at the digital environment, 
whereas other laws are not exclusively directed at the digital environment. This helps to explain 
the increase in the cybercrime rates in Uganda.8 
The Ugandan cyber legislation gives the government and its agencies unlimited powers 
with regard to procuring surveillance equipment, criminalising gadgets and policing internet 
content. Their powers range from illegally ordering internet service providers to block certain 
social platforms to signing secret memoranda of understanding among government agencies to 
share information about internet users and published content in order to enforce the Ugandan 
cyber legislation. Harassment of online activists by police has been reported also.9 
Many citizens view the internet as one of the last remaining independent platforms 
where decent and sound debate can take place and where ideas can be shared without political 
interference. These developments point to an urgent need to analyse the regulation of the 
internet in order for citizens to be able to exercise fundamental freedoms, to be empowered 
5 UN Special Rapporteur (2011) at 9 & 13. 
6 Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (2011) National Information Security Strategy 
(NIIS) at 56. 
7 Uganda vs Dr Aggrey Kiyingi [2006] UGHC 52 and Uganda vs Kato Kajubi [2010] UGCA 73. 
8 Mwaita & Owor (2013) at 10. 
9 Human Rights Watch (2018) at 504 & 575. 
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through the internet and to enhance cyber security. It is against this background that a critical 
analysis of the Ugandan cyber legal framework is proposed. 
1.2 The Cybercrime Phenomenon 
There is no universally agreed definition of cybercrime. A number of writers use the terms 
“cybercrime”, “computer-related crime”, “computer crime” and “high-tech crime” 
interchangeably. Cybercrime has been defined as “any method of criminality involving use of 
computers and the internet”.10 This definition points to two main components of cybercrime, 
namely, a computer and the internet. The term “computer” means: 
an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, data processing device, and a group 
of such interconnected or related devices performing logical, arithmetic, and storage 
functions; and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly 
related to or operating in conjunction with such a device or group of such 
interconnected or related devices.11 
The term “internet” is defined as: 
a global network wherein devices such as computers, servers, and smart devices are 
interconnected for data and information exchange. It comprises of public, private, 
individual and government networks in the domestic and global context, 
interconnected by a far-reaching array of electronic, wireless, and optical networking 
technologies.12 
The evolution of the internet dates back to 1969, following the creation of networking 
protocols by the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network.13 The internet protocol address 
forms the unique identity of a person on the internet. In 2016, the UN General Assembly 
adopted a non-binding resolution encouraging states parties to promote access to the internet 
at domestic level. The resolution also recognises internet freedom as a human right.14 
The concept of cybercrime is applied in relation to three dimensions of criminal activity. 
The first involves commission of traditional crimes, such as forgery, over electronic 
10 Berry (2018) “The Act of Cybercrime”, available at https://www.masthead.co.za/newsletter/the-act-of-
cybercrime/ (visited 29 May 2018). 
11 See Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act. 
12 IP Location, available at https://www.iplocation.net/internet (visited 14 October 2018). 
13 Byung-Keun (2005) at 51. 
14 UNGA Resolution No 32/L.20 on the Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the 
Internet (2016) paras 12 & 13. 
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communications networks and information systems. The second dimension covers publication 
of illegal content, such messages of ethnic hatred, using electronic media. The third concerns 
crimes exclusive to electronic networks, such as hacking and information system attacks.15 
Article 28(7) & (12) of the Constitution of Uganda prohibits criminal prosecution of a 
person under any law unless the act or omission in question constituted a criminal offence at 
the time of commission or omission, were defined under the law and the punishment was 
prescribed. The purpose of this provision is to uphold the accused’s right to a fair trial which, 
under Article 44 of the Constitution of Uganda, is non-derogable. The Ugandan Constitutional 
Court, in Damian Akankwasa v Uganda, noted that the test to be applied in petitions relating to 
Article 28(7) & (12) of the Constitution of Uganda is whether the acts or omissions allegedly 
performed by an accused person constituted a criminal offence at the time they were 
performed.16 
The clause “unless the offence is defined” set out in Article 28(12) of the Constitution is 
a complex concept in the investigation and prosecution of crime in Uganda. The Supreme Court 
of Uganda, in Attorney General v Salvatore Abuki, attempted to resolve this complexity. The 
learned justices pointed out that the Court has to determine whether the impugned statute 
provides sufficient basis for legal debate as to the scope of the conduct prohibited. Further, the 
Court held that the wording of Article 28(12) does not require that every word or group of 
words creating a criminal offence should be defined precisely in the English Dictionary.17 
The principles of nullum crimen sine lege18 and nulla poena sine lege19 curtail efforts to 
investigate and prosecute computer-related crimes in Uganda. This is because of continuous 
advances in the tools and techniques of cybercrime commission which facilitate “new crimes” 
not to be found in the statute books. Section 14(2) of the Judicature Act of 1996 grants 
jurisdiction to courts to apply natural law, principles of equity, customary law and common law 
15 Commission of the European Communities (2007) at 15. 
16 Constitutional Reference No 04/11 at 4. 
17 Constitutional Appeal No 1 of 1998 at 45. 
18 This means that an individual cannot face criminal liability except for an act that was criminalised by law 
before he or she performed the act. 
19 This principle means that a person cannot be punished for doing something that is not prohibited by law. 
12 
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doctrines insofar as they are consistent with natural law and good conscience.20 However, this 
provision is contrary to the constitutional requirement that only offences defined as such in 
written law be prosecuted and cannot be relied upon in the prosecution of conduct not defined 
as criminal. Thus, there is a gap in the law as regards combating computer-related crime in 
Uganda.21 
1.3 Statement of Problem 
The legal framework relating to cybercrime in Uganda is outdated and out of touch with 
developments in the computer world, and thus largely irrelevant in the circumstances. A case in 
point is the Evidence Act Cap 6, enacted in 1909. The current circumstances differ from those of 
1909 or even of eight years ago, if one considers the Computer Misuse Act of 2011 as an 
indicator of the dynamism in cyber usage. This dynamism renders the existing laws 
inappropriate and incapable of achieving the desired standards of cyber security. 
The provisions in some of these statutes are a violation of human rights and directed at 
suppression of opponents of the regime. An example is the switching off of social media and 
internet access prior to and during presidential elections.22 The basic freedoms under threat are 
the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy, which are laid out in several 
national23 and international24 instruments and treaties which Uganda has signed or ratified. 
Privacy has been defined as: 
the presumption that individuals should have an area of autonomous development, 
interaction, and liberty with or without interaction with others, free from state 
intervention and from excess unsolicited intervention by other uninvited 
individuals.25 
20 Judicature Act Cap 13, Laws of Uganda 2000. 
21 Amnesty International (2011) at 16. 
22 Amama Mbabazi vs Museveni & Ors (Presidential Election Petition No 1 of 2016), [2016] UGSC at 3. 
23 See Articles 22, 27, 29 & 41 of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (as amended). 
24 See Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. 
25 UN Special Rapporteur (2013) para 22. 
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A number of provisions in the Ugandan cyber-related statutes not only allow for search and 
seizure of private mobile electronic gadgets and computers,26 but also do not provide for long-
term measures which guarantee the protection of the right to privacy.27 
There are no provisions in the cyber legal framework for the establishment of an 
enforcement body or, at minimum, the empowerment of existing units, such as the Uganda 
Police Force. This omission puts both individuals and the state in peril of cybercrime. This 
danger has been aggravated by loss of confidence in state entities, which creates a challenge of 
under-reporting and affects negatively efforts by these organs to combat cybercrime.28 
Individuals with technical cyber knowledge thus continue to steal sensitive information and 
money through access to online bank accounts or credit card numbers used by online retailers. 
In addition, there are numerous juvenile pranks, such as erasing backup files, turning off 
telephone grids and interfering with traffic systems. These issues were exposed in the case of 
Uganda v Garuhanga and Mugerwa, wherein the accused were charged with embezzlement 
and false accounting, rather than with computer fraud or computer forgery, regarding the 
manipulation of computer data resulting in a loss of Ugx3.8 billion to Shell Uganda Limited.29 
The legal framework contains no requirements or mechanisms for entities using cyber 
space to instal cyber security tools. This creates a challenge for the detection and prevention of 
cybercrime by organs such as the Uganda Police Force. The problem was illustrated in the 
matter involving one Grace Muwanguzi, who was swindled out of a passport and US$500 by a 
company masquerading as an HIV/AIDs Trainer of Trainers project sponsored by the Ministry of 
Health and involving officials travelling to Toronto.30 
In addition, there is the lacuna regarding the regulation of the telecommunications 
services and service providers. The telecommunications industry is operated by private 
companies, namely, MTN, Airtel and Orange Telecom, all of which tend to pursue profit rather 
than making efforts to curb computer-related crime. However, there has been no reprimand for 
26 See Sections 18 & 19 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2002. 
27 Amnesty International (2011) at 14. 
28 Kizza (2003) at 18. 
29 [2004] CR 17 Buganda Road Court at 482. 
30 Kizza (2003) at 19. 
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cyber-related crimes attributable to these companies since there is no clear framework 
establishing liability in such circumstances. 
The existing legal framework of Uganda relating to cybercrime is ambiguous and 
inadequate. The result has been the ineffectiveness of existing entities, such as the Uganda 
Police Force, leading to an increase in cybercrime involving gross financial losses to both 
individuals and state entities, and to trampling of human rights, especially of opponents of the 
regime by the various state agencies. The existing legal framework leaves the victims, present 
and future, with no relief avenues. 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The study has two core objectives: 
• The focal objective of this study is to examine critically the law relating to cybercrime in 
Uganda in relation to established regional and international standards. 
• The study further aims at analysing whether the various cybercrimes in the Ugandan 
statute book are compatible with freedom of expression and the right to privacy and 
with full enjoyment of cyber space. 
1.5 Research Questions 
This research study seeks to answer the following questions: 
• What are the nature and form of the cybercrimes in the cyber legal framework of 
Uganda? 
• Are there lacunae and ambiguities in the Ugandan cyber legal framework? 
• If so, how best may such lacunae and ambiguities be resolved? 
1.6 Research Hypothesis 
This study is guided by the hypothesis that the provisions of Uganda’s cyber legal framework 
fall short of the established international standards, thereby facilitating advanced cyber 
insecurity and human rights violations. 
15 
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1.7 Significance of the Study 
There are but few writings regarding cybercrime in Uganda, especially critical analyses of the 
existing legal framework. This study contributes to bridging the gap in knowledge regarding 
cybercrime legislation in Uganda in relation to regional and international standards. 
1.8 Outline of the Remaining Chapters 
Chapter Two will discuss the various computer-related crimes enumerated in the various 
Ugandan statutes. 
Chapter Three presents a critical analysis of the Ugandan cyber legal framework in relation to 
regional and international standards. Reference will be made to various regional and 
international instruments on the right to privacy and freedom of expression. The chapter forms 
the gist of the study. 
Chapter Four will highlight the general conclusion and findings of the study. Also, it will explore 
how best the existing gaps in cyber-related law can be closed and how harmony may be created 
in the national, regional and international legal frameworks. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
COMPUTER-RELATED CRIMES IN UGANDAN STATUTES 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter comprises an analysis of the computer-related crimes enumerated in the various 
Ugandan statutes. The chapter also discusses the nature of computer-related crimes. It 
analyses these crimes in terms of three categories: offences against the state; offences against 
confidentiality and integrity; and offences against the person. 
2.2 Offences against the State 
Crimes committed by use of cyber networks can have a great impact on the security of the 
state. The intent of the perpetrators, coupled with the impact of a particular act, guides the 
classification of offences against the state. For the purposes of this paper, these offences will be 
discussed under two sub-headings: offences against critical national infrastructure and cyber-
terrorism offences. 
2.2.1 Offences against Key Public Infrastructure 
Today the operations of numerous critical sectors are dependent heavily on information and 
computer technology. It is therefore vital to protect these sectors against cyber-attacks.1 The 
Computer Misuse Act (CMA) of 2011 is silent on what amounts to “key public infrastructure”. 
Such a lacuna creates an ambiguity in the law and is likely to be used by the state in the 
oppression and persecution of opposition and the violation of fundamental human rights.2 Be 
that as it may, the concept of key public infrastructure encompasses: 
energy (including oil, natural gas, and electric power); banking and finance; 
transportation (including air, surface, and water transportation); information and 
1 US White House (2003) at 22 & 38. 
2 Nashif (2017) “Cybercrime Laws as a Weapon against Expression”, available at 
https://www.dw.com/en/cybercrime-laws- as-a-weapon-against-expression/a-41399283 (visited 18 
December 2018). 
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communications technology networks; water systems; and government and private 
emergency services.3 
Cyber-attacks on civilian infrastructure can result in disrupting of power grids, halting of trains, 
grounding of aircraft and oil pipeline explosions, among others.4 The substantial increase in 
these attacks and exposure of the infrastructural networks have propelled governments to 
recognise the seriousness of the issue. This has resulted in the establishment of mechanisms to 
enhance cybersecurity in respect of both government and private networks. In this regard, the 
Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 2002 describes a state or government facility as: 
Any permanent or temporary facility, and conveyance used or occupied by state 
representatives, government officials, the members of parliament, the judiciary, and 
employees of a public authority.5 
The CMA criminalises unauthorised modification of computer material. Section 14(1) of the 
CMA specifies the requisite intent for this offence as: 
Intent to cause a modification of the contents of any computer and in so doing 
impairs the operation of any computer or computer programme, hinder access to 
any programme, and data held in any computer. 
Further, the required intent need not be directed at any particular computer, programme or 
data. A reading of Section 14(4) of the CMA suggests that knowledge about intended 
modification, whether temporary or permanent, being unauthorised is sufficient to establish 
the guilt of the perpetrator. 
In addition, the CMA provides for an enhanced punishment for offences involving access 
to protected computers.6 The punishment is imprisonment for life. This punishment speaks to 
the gravity of offences against key public infrastructure. Section 20(2)(1) of the CMA describes a 
protected computer as: 
one used directly in connection with the security, defence or international relations 
of Uganda; existence or identity of a confidential information source relating to 
criminal law enforcement; the provision of services directly related to 
communications infrastructure, banking services, public utilities, and public key 
3 Stevens (2016) at 163 
4 Stevens (2016) at 163. 
5 See Section 2 of the Anti-Terrorism Act. 
6 See Section 20(1) of the Computer Misuse Act. 
18 
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infrastructure; and protecting public safety, systems relating to essential emergency 
services such as police, and medical services. 
Section 17 of the CMA extends the scope of offences against the state to the offence of 
unauthorised disclosure of access code. Section 17(2) of the CMA suggests that the 
perpetrator’s knowledge or belief of likely loss, damage or injury to a person or property is a 
key component in establishing criminal liability for this offence. Sections 21 and 22 of the CMA 
provide that abetment and attempts to commit the offences under the Act attract, on 
conviction, punishment for the offence abetted or attempted. 
2.2.2 Offences Related to Cyber Terrorism 
The concept of cyber terrorism does not have a universally accepted definition. Barry Collin 
coined the term in the 1970s. He viewed cyber terrorism as a mode in which computer attacks 
mirrored the effects of ordinary acts of terrorism.7 However, unlike the use of physical 
mechanisms, such as suicide bombing, the perpetrators conduct attacks using computer 
systems. The perpetrators, therefore, need not be present in the territory under attack.8 
Cyber terrorism also involves actions such as data theft, hacking, and attacks on 
information systems.9 The concept of cyber terrorism creates a link between the computer and 
acts of terrorism. The term “terrorism” has been defined as: 
criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death 
or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of 
terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate 
a population or compel a government or an international organisation to do or to 
abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as 
defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.10 
Section 13(1)(b) of the CMA criminalises access to a computer with intent to commit or 
facilitate the commission of an offence. Section 7 of the ATA provides that: 
a person commits an offence of terrorism when, with an intention of influencing the 
government or intimidating the public or a section of the public and for apolitical, 
7 Barry (1997a) at 17. 
8 Barry (1997a) at 18. 
9 Chawki et al (2015) at 39. 
10 UN Resolution No 1566 on Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts (2004) 
paras 3 & 4. 
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religious, social or economic aim, indiscriminately without due regard to the safety 
of others or property, seriously interferes with or disrupts an electronic system. 
2.3 Offences against Confidentiality, Integrity and the Availability of Computer Data and 
Systems 
2.3.1 Illegal Access to Computer and Information Systems 
Illegal access refers to unusual and frequent operations on computer systems without the 
authorisation of the owner.11 It usually involves the use of sophisticated software.12 The terms 
“unlawful”, “illegal” and “unauthorised” are used interchangeably in the different statutes. 
Access to a computer or computer network without authority or justification of right suffices as 
illegal access.13 
The offence of illegal access can take three forms and can be committed severally or 
jointly, depending on the nature of the act and culpability of the perpetrator. These three forms 
are: 
unlawful access to a computer system or network; unlawful access to a computer system or 
network with the intent of obtaining computer data or securing access to any programme, 
commercial or industrial secrets or confidential information; and unlawful access to a computer 
programme.14 
2.3.2 Hacking 
The CMA criminalises unauthorised use or interception of a computer service. Section 15(1) of 
the CMA provides that: 
A person who knowingly secures access to any computer without authority to 
obtain, directly or indirectly, any computer service commits an offence. 
This provision creates two instances of hacking: unauthorised acts relating to computer system 
and network accessibility; and ultra vires acts by the perpetrator.15 
11 Biegel (2001) at 20. 
12 Barry (1997b) at 20 & 24. 
13 Wilson (2003) at 3 & 36. 
14 Wilson (2003) at 33. 
15 Joyner & Lotrionte (2002) at 837 & 839. 
20 
                                                          
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
The House of Lords, in R v Bow Street Magistrate; ex parte US Government Allison,16 has 
given guidance on the liability of the perpetrator for ultra vires acts relating to computer 
network and system access. The court held that unauthorised access is established in the 
following scenarios: 
intentional access to specific data; access was unauthorised by a person entitled to 
authorise access to that computer or network; possession of knowledge by the 
perpetrator that the said access to the computer system was unauthorised.17 
In Attorney General’s Reference No 1 of 1991,18 the court noted that the offence of illegal 
access to a computer or data is not limited to intentional use of one computer to gain access to 
another computer.  Such an offence can also be committed using a single computer.19 
2.3.3 Unauthorised Interception 
Article 29(2)(a) of the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection 
urges states parties to put in place legislative and regulatory mechanisms to criminalise the 
fraudulent interception of computers and computer networks during non-public transmission. 
The Convention, further, urges states parties to criminalise attempt to commit this offence.20 
Section 15(1)(b) of the CMA criminalises: 
unauthorised interception and unlawful aiding of interception directly or indirectly 
of a computer or computer network by means of an electro-magnetic, acoustic, 
mechanical or other device irrespective of similarity. 
Section 2 of the CMA provides that interception, in the context of computer function: 
involves listening to or recording a function of a computer and acquiring the substance, meaning 
of such a function. 
2.3.4 Unlawful Data Interference 
Section 2 of the CMA describes data as any form of electronic representations of information. 
Section 8 of the CMA criminalises unauthorised data modification. Criminal liability for this 
offence is established where the perpetrator modifies or directs modification of computer data 
16 [1999] 3 WLR at 620. 
17 [1999] ALL ER 1, [2000] 2 AC 216.  
18 [1991] NI at 218. 
19 Joyner & Lotrionte (2002) at 840. 
20 Article 29(2)(b) of the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection. 
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without permission from the rightful owner of the data in question. The authority to interfere 
with data arises by law or as of right. 
This offence involves intentional damaging, deletion, alteration, destruction and 
suppression of data.21 The purpose of this enactment is to protect sensitive computer data and 
programmes from exposure to potential perpetrators. In Cox v Riley, the Court held that: 
it is immaterial whether the interference is temporary or permanent. It suffices that 
the acts committed interrupt or interfere with the lawful use of data by an entitled 
person, however slight.22 
2.3.5 Unlawful Interference with an Information System 
Section 2 of the CMA describes an information system as a system used for generating, sending, 
receiving, storing, displaying and processing data messages. This extends to internet and 
information sharing systems. Section 12(5) of the CMA provides that: 
a person who accesses an information system to constitute a denial of service to 
legitimate users, whether fully or partially, commits an offence. 
The requisite mens rea for this offence is established once there is interference with the 
computer system, irrespective of whether the offence is directed at a particular programme or 
data in a particular computer.23 
2.3.6 Misuse of Devices 
Section 12(1) of the CMA provides that: 
A person who unlawfully produces, sells, offers to sell, procures for use, designs, 
adapts for use, distributes or possesses a device, a computer programme or a 
component designed primarily to overcome security measures for the protection of 
data, and performs any of those acts with regard to a passcode or related type of 
data commits an offence.24 
21 See Section 9 of the Computer Misuse Act 2011. 
22 Cox v Riley [1986] 83 Criminal Appeal at 54. 
23 Power (2002) at 33. 
24 See Section 12(1) of the Computer Misuse Act. 
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The CMA further criminalises misuse of a computer or computer programme aimed at 
destroying computer security components, as well as hindering access to computer data and 
systems.25 
2.4 Offences Related to Identity Theft 
This is a new but rapidly growing mode of cybercrime.26 The concept of identity theft refers to 
criminal acts wherein the perpetrator fraudulently obtains and uses another person’s identity 
details.27 The technique used to obtain the victim’s biographical data is known as phishing.28 
The process starts when the perpetrators, masquerading as service providers, send 
indiscriminate messages to potential victims. The perpetrators identify themselves to their 
victims as officials in the commonly-used avenues of financial transactions such as PayPal, eBay, 
Hello Paisa, Mobile Money and MoneyGram.29 This offence is not defined expressly under the 
various statutes in Uganda. This lack of precision and clarity creates room for abuse by state 
agencies under the guise of preventing crime.30 
The scope of offences related to identity theft extends to the illegal installation of 
computer software, such as spyware, in the victim’s computer system. The aim of the 
perpetrator in such illegal installations is to keep track of the victim’s data: access codes, 
electronic transaction details, and whereabouts. The perpetrator monitors the flow and 
operation of data in the devices of the potential victim.31 This type of crime has been worsened 
by the invention of botnets, which use remote administration implements, such as malware, 
against the victim’s internet protocol address. These send and return messages, including 
gathered information, about the victim to the perpetrator in an automated manner.32 
25 See Section 12(3) of the Computer Misuse Act. 
26 Power (2002) at 30. 
27 Power (2002) at 53. 
28 Lynch (2014) at 262. 
29 Chawki et al (2015) at 45. 
30 Power (2002) at 29 & 33. 
31 Barry (1997b) at 20. 
32 Jakobsson & Myers (2006) at 215. 
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2.5 Computer-Related Economic Offences 
The purpose of criminalising computer-related economic offences, such as fraud and forgery, is 
to protect people’s interests in property, financial assets and document authenticity.33 The AU 
Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection urges member states to: 
establish key legislative and regulatory mechanisms to criminalise fraudulent 
procurement committed with the aid of a computer or cyber space.34 
Computer fraud may take the form of modification or alteration of computerised data for 
personal or third-party gain. According to the Electronic Transactions Act (ETA) of 2011, 
unlawful alteration extends to acts of unauthorised interference with the use of a given 
computer system.35 
2.5.1 Electronic Fraud 
Electronic fraud refers to: 
acts involving computer manipulation, by whatever technique, with a purpose of 
dishonestly obtaining money, property, some other form of advantage of value, and 
causing loss. Further, fraud includes making false statements to a person upon 
which said person relies to make a decision, resulting in damage to the innocent 
party.36 
Section 19(1) of the CMA criminalises electronic fraud. A reading of Section 19(2) of the CMA 
suggests that electronic fraud involves: 
deception performed deliberately with a purpose of securing an unlawful, and 
unfair gain wherein part of the communication facilitating commission of the 
offence is sent through a cyber system.37 
The fraud may be committed entirely within the computer network. The CMA imposes a fine 
not exceeding 360 currency points or imprisonment not exceeding 15 years or both upon a 
conviction for this offence.38 
33 Glyn (1983) at 84. 
34 Article 8 of the AU Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection. 
35 See Section 29(d) of the Electronic Transactions Act. 
36 Bainbridge (2007) at 280. 
37 See Section 19(2) of the Computer Misuse Act. 
38 See Section 19 of the Computer Misuse Act. 
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Section 26(3) of the ETA extends the scope of fraud to that committed often by 
companies, such as telecommunication companies, which charge customers for unsolicited 
messages and calls. This offence involves a person sending messages not sanctioned by the 
receiver. The punishment for this offence is a fine of 152 currency points or imprisonment not 
exceeding five years or both.39 The purpose of this provision is to curtail fraud primarily 
perpetrated by corporations charging telecommunication subscribers for unsolicited texts.40 
2.6 Offences Relating to Intellectual Property Rights 
Section 5(1)(e) of the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act (CNRA) of 2006 identifies 
computer programmes, electronic data banks and other accompanying materials as items 
eligible for copyright. Section 13(6) protects the economic rights of authors of computer 
programmes for a period of 50 years from the date of the programme being made available to 
the public. 
Section 46 of the CNRA provides for the various forms of copyright infringement. It 
encompasses unlawful dealing with works or performances of an individual: without 
authorisation by the bona fide owner of the rights; and in excess of or contrary to the nature of 
the authorisation granted to a person by the entitled person.41 The authorisation to use or alter 
a copyright may be obtained through transfer, licensing, assignment and any other form 
recognised under the laws of Uganda. This authorisation ought to be express and clear.42 This 
implies that unlawful usage of a person’s copyrightable material through a cyber network 
constitutes a computer-related offence. 
Further, Section 47(7)(a)-(b) of the CNRA criminalises illegal removal or alteration of any 
electronic moral rights information. The scope of this offence extends to availing performances, 
copies of a sound recordings, and audio-visual fixation to the public with prior knowledge by 
the perpetrator of its unauthorised alteration.43 
39 See Section 26(4) of the Electronic Transactions Act. 
40 Sofaer & Seymour (2001) at 89. 
41 See Section 47 of the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act. 
42 See Section 46(1) of the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act. 
43 See Section 47(c) of the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act. 
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In R v Gilham, the court set out the elements of computer-related copyright offences in 
the following terms: 
that the computer software is or includes copyright works within the meaning of the 
provisions of the intellectual property statute; that the copyright work was copied 
by the offender; that such copying is of the whole or a substantial part of a 
copyright work; that the copies of the copyright work or works created by or with 
the licence of the owner of the copyright include effective technological measures 
within the designed to protect those copyright works; that in the course of a 
business the defendant sold or let for hire a device, product or component which 
was primarily designed, produced, or adapted for the purpose of enabling or 
facilitating the circumvention of those technological measures. It bears noting that 
this issue does not depend on the intention of the defendant who is not responsible 
for the design, production, and adaptation of the device is irrelevant. His intention is 
irrelevant.44 
2.7 Offence of Cybersquatting 
Cybersquatting has been defined as: 
Illegal acts of registering, trafficking in and using an internet domain name with a 
wrongful intent to profit from the goodwill of a trademark or company belonging to 
another person.45 
Further, cybersquatting involves registration by the perpetrator of a domain name containing 
common words or an existing trademark or business name of a potential victim.46 The 
perpetrator uses the registered domain either to redirect business to himself or sell the domain 
at an inflated price; or he may use it to sell products or services which appear to have 
connections to the trademark or business in question. The victim is oftentimes unaware of the 
transaction at its initial stages because of the complexity of this offence and a lack of 
knowledge about computer-related crime.47 
2.8 Offences against the Person 
These are offences that have a direct impact on individuals.48 They include child pornography, 
cyber stalking, and cyber harassment. 
44 [2009] All ER at 89.  
45 Kilian (2000) at 25. 
46 Hansen-Young (2005) at 14. 
47 Chawki et al (2015) at 54. 
48 Kilian (2000) at 34. 
26 
                                                          
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
2.8.1 Offence of Child Pornography 
A child means a person below the age of 18 years.49 The avenues often used by perpetrators in 
the commission of this offence include websites, blogs, discussion forums and social media 
platforms, such as WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram.50 
Section 23 of the CMA criminalises child pornography. The offence of child pornography 
involves: 
production of child pornography for the purposes of its distribution through a 
computer; offering or making available child pornography through a computer; 
distributing or transmitting child pornography through a computer; procuring child 
pornography through a computer for himself or herself or another person; and 
unlawful possession of child pornography on a computer.51 
Further, Section 23(1)(b) of the CMA makes it an offence to make available pornographic 
materials to a child. 
Section 23(3) (a)-(c) of the CMA describes child pornographic materials to mean 
materials that portray: 
a child engaged in sexually suggestive or explicit conduct; a person appearing to be a child 
engaged in sexually suggestive or explicit conduct; and realistic images representing children 
engaged in sexually suggestive or explicit conduct. 
Section 23(4) of the CMA imposes a punishment of a 360-currency point fine or a 15-year jail 
sentence or both on a perpetrator convicted of the offence of child pornography. 
The Anti-Pornography Act (APA) of 2014 also criminalises acts of child pornography.52 It 
provides that a person commits an offence of child pornography by: 
producing, participating in the production of, trafficking in, publishing, broadcasting, 
procuring, importing, and exporting or in any way abetting pornography depicting 
images of children. 
The Act provides for a fine of 750 currency points or imprisonment not exceeding 15 years or 
both as the punishment for said offence. Section 14(2) of the APA stipulates that, in 
49 See Section 2 of the Anti-Pornography Act 2014 & Article 2 of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child. 
50 Coetzee (2013) at 752. 
51 See Section 23(1) of the Computer Misuse Act. 
52 See Section 14 of the Anti-Pornography Act. 
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determining liability for the offence of child pornography, the definition contained in section 2 
of the same statute should be considered. 
2.8.2 Offence of Offensive Communication 
The offence of offensive communication covers acts relating to possession of written material 
or recorded pictures or sounds which are threatening, insulting or abusive, with the purpose of 
using them against the integrity or confidentiality of an individual. This negative data then is 
channelled through a computer network to a third-party in order to disgrace the victim. In 
worst-case scenarios, such as blackmail, the perpetrator may seek a ransom from the victim in 
order to contain the abuse.53 
Article 29(3)(1)(f)-(h) of the African Union Convention urges states parties to criminalise 
acts of offensive communication. The African Union Convention provides that: 
Acts of offensive communication extend to threats and insults channelled through a 
computer systems against a person owing to the person’s membership of a 
particular group distinguished by race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin or 
religion where such membership serves as a pretext for any of these factors, or 
against a group of persons which is distinguished by any of the characteristics.54 
These acts involve wilful and repeated use of electronic media to disrupt peace, and are a 
hindrance to the enjoyment of the right to privacy by the victim, given that the intent of 
perpetrator is to use an illegitimate communication to cause grief to the victim. The scope of 
the offence extends to attempts by the perpetrator to commit it.55 This offence is treated as a 
misdemeanour and upon conviction attracts a fine of 24 currency points.56 
2.8.3 Offence of Cyber Harassment 
This is provided for under section 24 of the CMA. It involves: 
making obscene, indecent, lewd, and lascivious requests, suggestions, and 
proposals; threats calculated at inflicting injury or physical harm to a person or 
property; and a person authorising use of electronic devices with knowledge that 
53 Chawki et al (2015) at 40. 
54 See Article 29(3)(1)(g) of the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection. 
55 See Section 25 of the Computer Misuse Act. 
56 See Section 25(2) of the Computer Misuse Act. 
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device in question is to be used in the commission of the acts in section 24 of the 
Act. 
The CMA provides for a fine of 72 currency points or imprisonment for three years or both as 
punishment for this offence.57 
2.8.4 Offence of Cyber Stalking 
According to Mishler, this offence involves continuous use of cyber space and electronic devices 
to intimidate or annoy a person or group of persons.58 However, there are numerous acts 
associated with cyber stalking. Such acts include threats, false accusations, insults, network 
attacks, unlawful spying, impersonation, harassment, and physical assaults upon the victim. The 
establishment of a causal link between cyber space and any of such acts points to the offence 
of cyber stalking.59 
Section 26 of the CMA criminalises frequent malicious and wilful cyber harassment of a 
person. Further, a reading of the section suggests that threatening persons with an intent to 
put them under reasonable fear for their personal safety or the safety of their immediate family 
members suffices as cyber stalking.60 The punishment upon conviction for the offence of cyber 
stalking is a fine not exceeding 120 currency points or imprisonment not exceeding five years or 
both.61 
2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the various cybercrimes listed under the various Ugandan statutes. 
These involve offences against the state, individual confidentiality, integrity and reputation, and 
cyber-related economic offences. However, key concepts in the investigation and prosecution 
of these offences remain undefined, such as “key public infrastructure” and “public data”. The 
chapter reveals that certain crimes are not defined clearly under the statutes. These 
57 See Section 24(2) of the Computer Misuse Act. 
58 Mishler (2000) at 116. 
59 Beagle (2011) at 457. 
60 See Section 26(1) of the Computer Misuse Act. 
61 See Section 26(2) of the Computer Misuse Act. 
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ambiguities in the law carry a risk of being utilised by state authorities to violate fundamental 
human rights. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
UGANDAN CYBRECRIME LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the international human rights standards relating to the 
right to privacy and freedom of expression. This is done by analysing various provisions in 
regional and international statutes, treaties, declarations and conventions. The chapter, 
further, sets out an analysis of the legal restrictions affecting the free use of cyber space. 
It bears noting that the international human rights standards in question are mostly soft 
law. Therefore, they are largely non-binding upon states parties. They take the form of 
recommendations and guidelines. The right to privacy differs from data protection rights, 
although they overlap. Personal data is defined as any information capable of being identified 
with a natural person. The distinction between the right to privacy and data protection rights is 
that not all information relating to an identifiable person falls within the scope of privacy. Data 
protection rights cover a wider scope compared to privacy. 
3.2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) came into force on 23 March 
1976 and was ratified by Uganda in 1995. It is a multilateral treaty. Article 17 of the ICCPR 
prohibits arbitrary or unlawful interference with an individual’s privacy, family, home or 
correspondence and unlawful attacks upon a person’s honour and reputation.1 Further, the 
Covenant provides for freedom of expression,2 which includes an individual’s ability to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, whether orally, in 
writing or in print, in the form of art or through any other media of his choice.3 
1 See Article 17(1) of the ICCPR. 
2 See Article 19 of the ICCPR. 
3 See Article 19(2) of the ICCPR. 
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The UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) asserts that freedom of expression extends 
to internet and computer-based forms of expression.4 The rationale for this assertion is to cater 
for the dynamics in information and communication technology.5 The Constitution of the 
Republic of Uganda guarantees the right to privacy6 and freedom of expression.7 The 
constitutional guarantees of these rights are appealing in theory, but the practice reveals 
persistent non-observance. However, enjoyment of this right is subject to limitations in the 
form of protection of the public interest and enjoyment of fundamental human rights by other 
persons.8 The Constitution, however, does not define “public interest”. 
The ICCPR obligates states parties to establish and maintain measures to secure media 
independence and freedom of access to electronic and print media. The right to access 
information requires states parties to set up mechanisms of access to data in the custody of 
state agencies.9 The dates of production, form of data storage and source, extra-judicial arrests, 
torture, murder, and threats to human life should not be used as a limitation upon access to 
public information. However, Article 19(3) of the Covenant empowers states parties to activate 
limitations where enjoyment of cyber freedoms poses a threat to the national interest and the 
restrictions adopted are essential to protect other people’s rights, public order, public health 
and the values of society. According to the ICCPR, the restrictions must be proportionate and 
prescribed in law. 
According to the UNHRC, states parties should ensure that their law enforcement 
agencies respect and uphold the freedom of expression. These measures should be published 
and accessible to the public.10 Further, restrictions on the use of search engines, websites and 
social media should accord with Article 19(3) of the Covenant. 
4 UN Special Rapporteur (2013) para 22. 
5 Sobotta & Kokkot (2013) at 225. 
6 See Article 27 of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda. 
7 See Article 26 of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda. 
8 See Article 43 of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda. 
9 See Article 19(2) of the ICCPR. 
10 UN Special Rapporteur (2011) paras 584 & 585. 
32 
                                                          
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
The UNHRC submits that states parties should ensure that their counter-terrorism 
measures are compatible with the Covenant.11 Therefore, terrorism-related crimes, such as 
encouraging terrorism, justifying terrorism and praising terrorism, should be written and 
described clearly under the law of the state party. The rationale is to protect individuals from 
political persecution under the guise of anti-terrorism campaigns. In addition, media houses 
and journalists should not be restricted unjustifiably and penalised for acts in discharge of 
lawful duties.12 
The Covenant prohibits unlawful surveilling, wire-tapping and interception of 
communication lines.13 It obligates states parties to establish measures to prevent third parties 
from illegally accessing information about the private life of individuals. Therefore, states 
parties are required to legislate for the protection of personal data held by private and public 
entities, irrespective of the nature of the device. Individuals must be able to liaise with the 
technology firms regarding the maintenance and security of their data. This means that 
individuals should be allowed to make alterations to their personal data in the custody of 
agencies.14 
3.3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. 
The Declaration prohibits unlawful interference with a person’s home, family, privacy, honour 
and correspondence or attacks upon an individual’s reputation.15 This means that states parties 
have to establish measures to protect and uphold these rights. The UDHR further stipulates that 
every person has a right to freedom of expression and opinion.16 The freedom of opinion 
involves seeking, receiving and imparting information and ideologies without unlawful 
interference. 
11 UNHRC General Comment 16 to Article 17 of the ICCPR (1988) paras 6, 7 & 8. 
12 Sobotta & Kokkot (2013) at 224 & 226. 
13 See Article 17 of the ICCPR. 
14  UN Special Rapporteur (2011) para 588. 
15 See Article 12 of the UDHR. 
16 See Article 19 of the UDHR. 
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3.4 European Convention on Human Rights 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is the major human rights instrument in the 
European region. It is not binding on Uganda. However, the European region largely has upheld 
the protection of human rights and conforms to international standards. Therefore, the legal 
standards in the region can be used to shape Uganda’s human rights standards. Article 8 of the 
Convention provides for respect for a person’s privacy and protection of freedom of expression. 
The freedom of expression involves protection of freedom of opinion, regardless of frontiers.17 
These rights can be subject to restrictions only in terms of written law. 
Further, the restrictions must be in accordance with established democratic principles, 
for public safety and necessary for the protection of health, morals, state interests and other 
people’s rights.18 According to the ECHR, restrictions may be invoked to prevent disclosure of 
confidential information and crime, and maintenance of impartiality in state organs.19 The 
European Court of Human Rights, in Dubská and Krejzová v Czech Republic, has given guidance 
on the test for activating public interest as a restriction. The Court, inter alia, noted that: 
Therefore, there has to be a social interest proportionate to the legitimate aim sought by the 
government in order to invoke interference with a person’s communication and devices.20 
3.5 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
The European Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR) came into force in 2009. The ECFR is not 
binding on Uganda. However, like the ECHR, the ECFR largely conforms to the standards set by 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. For this reason, coupled with the 
standard of implementation of the ECFR, it is worth borrowing a leaf from it in the context of 
human rights protection in Uganda. It should be noted that in cases of corresponding provisions 
in the ECFR and the ECHR, the rights in question are assumed to be similar.21 
Article 7 of the Charter provides protection of the right to respect for individuals, 
families, homes and communications. The ECFR, further, provides for protection of a person’s 
17 See Article 8(1) of the ECHR. 
18 See Article 8(2) of the ECHR. 
19 See Article 10(2) of the ECHR. 
20 Applications 28859/11 and 28473/12 paras 5 & 6. 
21 See Article 52(3) of the ECFR. 
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private data.22 In addition, limitations to this right should be exercised fairly. The Charter 
provides that the consent of the person in question should be obtained through legitimate 
procedures. This right extends to one’s ability to access information concerning one in another 
person’s custody and the right to rectify the data in question.23 Article 8(3) of the ECFR calls 
upon states parties to establish an autonomous body charged with ensuring compliance of their 
data protection rules with the provisions of the ECFR. 
In 2004, the European Court of Justice declared invalid Directive 2006/24/EC for 
containing provisions interfering with the observance, upholding and protection of the right to 
respect, privacy and protection of personal information beyond the prescribed standard of 
restriction. The Court held that the European Union Legislature, in endorsing the Directive, 
acted ultra vires.24 
Article 11 of the Charter provides that every individual has a right to freedom of 
expression. This right extends to freedom of opinion and freedom to access and share data and 
opinions without state or private interference, regardless of frontiers.25 Article 11(2) urges 
states parties to respect media pluralism and freedoms. Thus, any limitations on enjoyments of 
the rights and freedoms listed in the ECFR must be prescribed by law and consider the 
importance of such rights and freedoms.26 Limitations should be activated in accordance with 
the recognised interests of the European Union. The limitations should be invoked as a last 
resort against cyber misuse. 
3.6 American Convention on Human Rights 
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) is not binding on Uganda but is an example 
of an instrument largely compliant with international human rights protection standards. The 
Convention prohibits unlawful interference with a person’s communications, information, 
22 See Article 8 of the ECFR. 
23 See Article 8(2) of the ECFR. 
24 Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12. 
25 See Article 11(1) of the ECFR. 
26 See Article 52 of the ECFR. 
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devices, data, family and property. This protection extends to illegal attacks on a person’s 
character.27 
Article 13(1) of the ACHR provides that freedom of expression: 
involves freedom to access, seek, distribute, and impart ideologies and information 
irrespective of frontiers and form of media used by the person.28 
The common typologies are electronic and print media. The Convention suggests that freedom 
of expression ought not to be subject to restrictions.29 States parties are prohibited from 
activating indirect control measures, such as suspension of media, that limit enjoyment of these 
rights and freedoms.30 However, states parties can subject the freedom to liability which should 
be written clearly and described under the law.31 
3.7 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
Uganda ratified the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) in 1986. It is binding 
on Uganda. The Charter has no express provisions on the right to privacy. However, the ACHPR 
provides for freedom of expression.32 Article 8(1) of the Charter states that this freedom 
includes the right to receive and disseminate information in accordance with the prescribed law 
of the state party. 
3.8 International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications 
Surveillance 
These Principles are drawn from reports and opinions of civil society, industrialists, 
international human rights law experts, distinguished academicians, and international best 
practices. They are referred to also as the Necessary and Proportionate Principles (NPPs). The 
NPPs attempt to explain the current trends in international human rights application, 
particularly regarding information and cyber systems. Therefore, states parties ought to adopt 
27 UN Special Rapporteur (2011) para 586. 
28 See Article 13(1) of the ACHR. 
29 See Article 13(2) of the ACHR. 
30 See Article 13(1) of the ACHR. 
31 See Article 13(4) of the ACHR. 
32 See Article 9 of the ACPHR. 
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and practise the Principles in order to realise an effective human rights protection system. 
However, the NPPs are not legally binding.33 
The principles of proportionality, transparency, necessity, adequacy, communication 
integrity, legitimacy, transnational co-operation and legality are vital in the activation of the 
NPPs. The principle of proportionality means communication-related decisions should be made 
in consideration of the sensitivity of the data accessed and likely damage to be caused by such 
release. With regard to adequacy, communication restrictions should be legitimate and 
appropriate to the identified purpose.34 
States parties are required to establish communication surveillance mechanisms and 
procedures that are protective of human rights. The process of communication surveillance 
involves operations such as crime investigation, enhancement of state security networks, and 
protection of other people’s rights. In activating communication surveillance, state agencies 
should ensure that: 
the device or data in question is relevant and necessary in investigation and 
prosecution of a particular crime; there is overwhelming evidence of a crime being 
committed or being about to be committed; all less aggressive techniques have 
been exhausted or will be futile; accessibility to data will be confined to that 
relevant in the investigation and prosecution of a heinous crime or threat to public 
interest; a person’s data collected will be protected from third parties; this involves 
complete destruction of the said data once the criminal proceedings end; the 
information will only be used for the purpose brought to the person’s notice; the 
proposed techniques do not restrict the individual’s enjoyment of fundamental 
rights and freedoms; and the agencies conducting the surveillance are autonomous 
in their operations.35 
3.9 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet 
This Declaration was adopted in 2011. It is authored by Special Rapporteurs for Freedom of 
Expression across the globe. The Declaration discusses issues related to maintenance and 
protection of the right to privacy and freedom of opinion and expression, with a focus on 
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Declaration lists 
guidelines essential to protecting internet freedoms. These include: 
33 UN Special Rapporteur (2013) paras 23 & 24. 
34 Principle III of the NPPs. 
35 LaRue et al (2014) at 52. 
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absolute protection of third parties with respect to data produced by technical 
internet providers; regulatory systems for other technologies should not be applied 
to cyber freedoms; States Parties to apply ‘real and substantial connection’ and 
‘substantial harm’ tests in ascertaining criminal and civil jurisdiction in computer-
related offences; States Parties called upon to formulate and implement strategies 
aimed at promoting access to and use of internet; transparency in communication 
control mechanisms and non-discriminatory treatment of cyber networks and 
systems; and cyber filtering systems such as blocking access to particular websites 
should only be permitted in cases of protection of other peoples’ fundamental 
human rights. For example, protecting children from pornography and ideological 
disorientation.36 
These guidelines, though not legally binding on Uganda, could help in shaping a pro-human 
rights legal, policy and institutional framework in the country. 
3.10 African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms 
This Declaration was launched in 2014, with the purpose of establishing and developing 
regional standards regarding internet and computer freedoms.37 Further, the Declaration 
echoes the need for concerted efforts of all stakeholders, including civil society, regional and 
international organisations, to ensure enjoyment of the right to privacy and freedom of 
expression.38 The Declaration suggests key principles to be adopted by states parties to realise 
the desired standards of enjoyment of internet freedom. These include: 
(a) Openness. This involves creating and enhancing favourable avenues for exchange of 
ideas and information. This is achieved by creating an integrated system that promotes 
freedom of opinion and expression, cultural diversity and media pluralism. States parties 
also have to support cyber-related innovativeness and invention.39 
(b) Internet Access and Affordability. This includes states parties making the internet 
affordable and available to the citizenry without discrimination as to sex, race, social 
origin and any other status. The justification for this principle is its being a necessity for 
the realisation of human development. This is because the internet plays a key role in 
36 UN Special Rapporteur (2012) para 33. 
37 See Para 5 of the Preamble to the Declaration. 
38 See Paras 6 & 7 of the Preamble to the Declaration. 
39 Key Principle 1 of the Declaration. 
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the enjoyment of other fundamental human rights, such as the right to education, 
assembly, and socio-cultural participation.40 
(c) Freedom of expression. This involves freedom to access and impart ideas or information 
of all forms through cyber space, regardless of frontiers. This freedom should be subject 
only to restrictions that are necessary and proportionate to the state party’s legitimate 
purpose.41 
(d) Right to information. The principle suggests that information related to scientific and 
social research should be made available to persons interested in accessing it.42 
The other principles highlighted in the Declaration are: freedom of association, cultural 
diversity, the right to access knowledge, cyber security, protecting internet freedoms of 
marginalised groups, the right to due process, gender equality and democratic cyber network 
management.43 
States parties and non-state entities, such as civil society, academic and research 
institutions, media houses, and information and technology corporations, can adopt the 
Declaration and use it to shape and enhance internet freedom protection standards in the 
region. In addition, the Declaration obligates states parties to establish safeguards against 
violations of the right to privacy and freedom of opinion, and ensure that the 
telecommunications and cyber sectors are facilitated, transparent and independent in 
discharging their duties.44 
The above discussion (§3.2 to §3.10) presents the established best practices and 
international and regional standards related to protecting enjoyment of internet freedoms. 
These are drawn from regional and international instruments, reports by UN Special 
Rapporteurs and treaties. There appears to be a common ground in requiring states parties to 
promote the enjoyment of internet freedom by everyone. The discourse points to the nature 
and conditions attached to potential restrictions upon the enjoyment of these rights and 
40 Key Principle 2 of the Declaration. 
41 Key Principle 3 of the Declaration. 
42 Key Principe 4 of the Declaration. 
43 Key Principles 5,6,7,8,9,10 & 12 of the Declaration. 
44 www.africainternetrights.org (visited 2 May 2019). 
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freedoms. The analysis below involves a critique of the existing cyber-related legal framework 
of Uganda against the regional and international standards. 
3.11 Anti-Terrorism Act 
In 2002, as a response to global calls to combat terrorism, the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) was 
enacted in Uganda. The ATA provides for the death sentence as punishment for persons who 
establish, run or support terrorist institutions, through imparting ideologies to others, raising 
funds for terrorism or mobilising persons for terrorist operations.45 The Act indirectly permits 
interference with a person’s private data, family, life and correspondences upon suspicion of 
the person committing or planning to commit terrorism. 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy asserts that under international 
human rights law states are required to criminalise incitement of terrorism at the domestic 
level.46 However, such criminal provisions should comply with the regional and international 
standards. The restrictions should be in pursuance of a legitimate aim and respect for the 
principles of proportionality and necessity. 
The Special Rapporteur proposes further that the desire to protect state security and 
implement counter-terrorism measures cannot be used to justify a violation of the right to 
privacy and freedom of expression. The Special Rapporteur considers that restrictions upon the 
enjoyment of these rights can be activated only when: 
the information disseminated is calculated at inciting imminent violence; the 
information in question is likely to incite such violence; and there is a substantial 
immediate and direct nexus between the expression and the possibility or actual 
occurrence of such violence.47 
The ATA is silent on the definition of promotion of terrorism. Further, the ATA does not provide 
for what amounts to pro-terrorism material. It is right to hold that this law is ambiguous, 
unpredictable and thus falls short of the established international standards of transparency 
and predictability of the law. This lacuna creates an enforcement dilemma and makes citizens 
45 See Section 9(1) & (2) of the ATA. 
46 UN Special Rapporteur (2013) para 81. 
47 UN Special Rapporteur (2012) para 73. 
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susceptible to unnecessary surveillance. In addition, the UN Human Rights Committee, in a 
commentary on Article 19 of the ICCPR, postulates that states parties should protect persons 
from all forms of attack arising from their expressions, opinions and ideologies. These attacks 
include torture, extra-judicial arrests, and threats to one’s life, property and family.48 
Section 9(2) of the ATA provides for the death sentence as punishment for the 
publication or dissemination of pro-terrorism material. The death sentence as a punishment for 
a crime defined ambiguously in the ATA is an attack upon the enjoyment of internet freedoms 
enshrined in the various international instruments that Uganda has signed or ratified. The 
punishment is also a violation of international human rights, particularly the right to life and 
protection against degrading treatment. In addition, arbitrary use of criminal sanctions to 
curtail legitimate expression of opinions and ideologies is a grave limitation upon the 
enjoyment of that freedom. 
Part VII of the ATA covers communication surveillance. Section 18 authorises the 
Minister of Internal Affairs to designate officers with rights to conduct surveillance on an 
individual, group or institution suspected of committing any of the offences in the ATA. The 
surveillance is conducted on the person’s devices, electronic media platforms and 
correspondence. According to the ATA, communication surveillance may be conducted to: 
safeguard state interest; prevent violation of fundamental human rights and 
freedoms of other persons through acts of terrorism; detect and prevent 
commission of any offence under the Act; and protect the state economy from 
terrorism.49 
Section 20 of the ATA prescribes a two-year jail term for a person who obstructs an officer 
conducting surveillance under Part VII. The Act is silent on the procedure to be followed by the 
Minister in designating the officials to conduct communication surveillance. Such gaps in the 
law serve only to create a suitable environment for abuse of power by the designated persons, 
to the detriment of the citizenry. The Act is also bereft of impartial, transparent and 
autonomous checks regarding such arbitrary actions. 
48 UN Special Rapporteur (2012) paras 77 & 78. 
49 See Sections 18 & 19 of the ATA. 
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The failure of the ATA to conform to the established regional and international 
standards has been summarised by Amnesty International in the following terms: 
the overly broad definitions of “terrorism”, “aiding and abetting” terrorism and the 
fact that “promoting terrorism” is not defined under the Uganda Anti-Terrorism Act 
are to be viewed as inhibiting media pluralism and criminalising legitimate media 
coverage. Even the interception powers of the authorised officers are criticised as 
they could make it possible to intercept communications between journalists and 
their sources.50 
It is submitted that the Anti-Terrorism Act contains provisions that are in violation of or create 
an environment for the violation of people’s fundamental rights, particularly cyber freedoms. 
The Act falls short of the regional and international standards regarding protection of the right 
to privacy and freedom of expression. 
3.12 National Information Technology Authority Act 
The National Information Technology Authority Act (NITA-U Act) establishes and empowers the 
National Information Technology Authority (NITA-U). The Authority is mandated to design and 
enforce policies and strategies necessary for promoting a vibrant technological system in the 
country.51 Section 5 of the Act attempts to structure broad functions, and makes public 
servants susceptible to communication and information surveillance. 
Section 5(3) of the NITA-U Act mandates the Authority to co-ordinate, supervise and 
monitor the use of information technology systems. However, the Act is silent on the scope of 
the supervision and monitoring to be done by NITA-U. The Act leaves the concept of “use of 
information technology systems” unexplained, making this provision unclear and ambiguous. 
The provision creates space for a default interpretation of the concept of technological utility 
which expands the supervisory and monitory powers of the Authority. This interpretation easily 
could subject persons to illegal cyber attacks and unlawful interceptions of personal data. 
The Act also mandates NITA-U to regulate and enforce standards for information 
technology hardware and software equipment procurement in all government sectors, agencies 
50 Amnesty International (2011) at 14. 
51 See Section 3(2) of the NITA-U Act. 
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and parastatals.52 This mandate can be exploited to instal spy software and filters in the state 
devices. These software programmes conduct illegal surveillance on civil servants by relaying 
reports on their website visits and correspondence. NITA-U also is obligated to create, design 
and maintain a national data system.53 The statute is silent on the nature, mode and form of 
data to be stored in the national database. The origin, maintenance and procedures of 
obtaining said data equally are unexplained in the Act. This gap creates room for illegal 
interception under the guise of collecting data for the national database, which violates the 
right to privacy. Further, the nature of the database is unclear. This makes people’s data 
susceptible to unlawful access by third parties. 
The Act obligates NITA-U to establish, maintain and regulate aspects of technological 
planning, organisation, delivery, support systems, disposal, database security, policy 
implementation and disposal systems.54 Section 5 of the Act grants wide undefined powers to 
NITA-U to establish guidelines and regulations regarding the utility of information technology 
systems. The Act does not explain what the regulation procedures involve, thereby creating 
opportunities for violation of the right to privacy through unnecessary interceptions of and 
interference with personal data and devices. 
Part V of the Act regulates information technology surveys and the powers of NITA-U. 
Section 2 states that technology surveys involve: 
the review, examination, inquiry, information gathering and analysis of ICT-related 
materials or data. 
The Minister of Information and Computer Technology, with the consent of the board 
established under the Act, is authorised to give directions for conducting a survey in the public 
and private sectors.55 According to Section 7(2) of the Act, the board members are appointed 
by the Minister. This establishes a dilemma for ensuring transparency and autonomy in internal 
checks regarding acts of the Minister and NITA-U. 
Section 19(3) of the NITA-U Act provides that: 
52 See Section 5(3) of the NITA-U Act. 
53 See Section 5(e) of the NITA-U Act. 
54 See Section 5(6) of the NITA-U Act. 
55 See Section 19(1) of the NITA-U Act. 
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while conducting the survey, data collection by the designated officers involves use 
of search warrants and summons. 
The authorised officer involved in data collection may extend the scope of information 
prescribed in a warrant to involve any data he considers pertinent to the survey being 
conducted.56 The requested person must give all required information or access to a device to 
the authorised officer in the time prescribed in the search warrant.57 
Section 21 of the NITA-U Act grants NITA-U officials authority, during “reasonable 
times”, to enter upon, inspect and make inquiries thought to be relevant to a technology survey 
being conducted. The Act is silent on the meaning of “reasonable times”. The Act criminalises 
obstruction of Authority officials in the discharge of their lawful obligations.58 It is also an 
offence to withhold any information or device required by the Authority officials in the conduct 
of the survey.59 The prescribed punishment upon conviction is a six-month jail term or a fine 
not exceeding 12 currency points or both.60 
However, the statute is silent on the goals and objectives of conducting the information 
technology surveys. The broad undefined search, inquiry and seizure powers granted to the 
state officials with respect to conducting the cyber-related surveys generate unpredictability 
and ambiguity in the enforcement of the law, with foreseeable violations of the internet 
freedoms of the citizens. This is aggravated by a lack of clarity about the nature and scope of 
the information required by NITA-U. The system is devoid of autonomous checks and thus falls 
short of international standards for enhancing a transparent and predictable system. The 
statute also creates an opportunity for unlawful surveillance and abuse of the right to privacy 
by enabling the installation of spyware and unlawful access to personal data by third parties. 
Further, sections 34-39 of the NITA-U Act grant wide and unchallenged powers to the 
Minister of Information and Computer Technology to make directives and make regulations 
necessary for implementing the Act, including declaring acts that amount to crimes under the 
56 See Section 20(1) of the NITA-U Act. 
57 See Section 20(2) of the NITA-U Act. 
58 See Section 38 of the NITA-U Act. 
59 See Section 38(4) of the NITA-U Act. 
60 See Section 38(5) of the NITA-U Act. 
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Act and prescribing punishment for such offences. The checks and balances established under 
the statute are weak and create an enabling environment for abuse of power by the Minister. 
3.13 Regulation of Interception of Communications Act 
This statute came into force on 3 September 2010. The Regulation of Interception of 
Communications Act (RICA) obligates the Minister of Security to establish and maintain a 
communication interception Monitoring Centre.61 The Act also provides that lawful 
interception may be authorised by the Minister upon application by authorised persons. 
Section 4 of RICA provides that said authorised persons are the heads of the various security 
agencies, namely, Uganda People’s Defence force, Uganda Police, External Security 
Organisation and Internal Security Organisation. RICA also requires the Chief Justice to 
designate a judge for the purpose of granting warrants of interception under the Act.62 
Whereas the Act lists grounds upon which a warrant of interception may be issued, the law 
paves the way for the issue of a warrant upon proof of a legitimate interest, as opposed to 
proof of existence of substantial reasonable grounds.63 The evidentiary burden to be 
discharged by officials is weak. 
This creates an opportunity for abuse of functions by the officials for personal interests 
and political persecutions. The system also lacks impartial, independent and competent checks 
and balances. This is evident in the Chief Justice having sole power in designating judges for the 
implementation of RICA.64 RICA bases the grounds for application of a warrant of interception 
on threats to the national economic interest.65 However, the statute is silent on the meaning of 
national economic interest. This imprecision and ambiguity in defining key concepts in the 
enforcement of RICA create an environment for loose interpretation, potentially to the 
detriment of innocent citizens. 
61 See Section 3 of RICA. 
62 See Section 1(b) of RICA. 
63 See Sections 5, 6 & 7 of RICA. 
64 See Section 1 of RICA. 
65 See Section 5 of RICA. 
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Section 9 of RICA obligates telecommunication companies to ensure registration of all 
SIM cards issued to users. The process of registration involves the creation and maintenance of 
a database of all registered customers of the telecommunication firms. The Act does not 
provide details relating to maintaining the data bases by these firms. It bears noting that 
majority of the telecommunication firms are multinational corporations with their 
administrative systems in foreign states. This creates opportunities for illegal access to personal 
data of Ugandans by third parties, especially in the countries where these companies are 
headquartered. Contrary to international standards calling for consent of the person whose 
information is sought, the telecommunication companies can give personal data to other public 
and private agencies upon request, without seeking the affected person’s consent. This is a 
gross violation of the established regional and international standards relating to the nature 
and justification of limitations upon enjoyment of internet freedom. 
Section 10 of RICA provides for access to and disclosure of protected data. Section 1 of 
the Act defines protected data as data encrypted by a key. The protected information can be 
obtained by serving notice on a person believed to be in possession of the information. The Act 
permits authorised officers to act as intermediaries in obtaining the protected information. 
However, the authorised official may issue a notice of disclosure of protected information on a 
person upon belief that: 
a key to any protected information is in the possession of any person; the 
imposition of disclosure requirement in respect of the protected information is 
necessary; it is in the interest of national security; the same is for the purpose of 
preventing or detecting an offence of drug trafficking or human trafficking; and it is 
in the interest of the economic well-being of Uganda.66 
The notice of disclosure has to be in writing, detailing the time limits for compliance and the 
information required.67 
RICA presents a lot of undefined, imprecise and unclear terminology, procedures and 
terms of reference for the officials involved in its implementation. Further, RICA contains gaps 
that curtail efficiency in its implementation. The low evidential threshold which allows for the 
66 See Section 10(1) of RICA. 
67 See Section 10(2) of RICA. 
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issuing interception warrants on proof of “reasonable” grounds by the authorised officers 
creates an environment for abuse of process and violation of the right to privacy.68 Amnesty 
International calls for explicit provisions requiring judicial authorisation for disclosure of 
protected information.69 
3.14 Electronic Signatures Act 
The Electronic Signatures Act (ESA) was enacted to regulate use of electronic signatures in e-
transactions. Section 2 of the Act presents a gap in the regulation of data flow and use of 
electronic signatures in Uganda. The definition of “electronic signature” provided by the Act is 
ambiguous. These gaps in the law pose a threat of cyber-attacks by aiding identity discovery of 
persons using an electronic signature. 
Part IV of the Act mandates NITA-U to manage, monitor and control key public 
infrastructure.70 Section 88 gives a police officer unfettered and broad powers to: 
access any computerised data whether stored in a computer or otherwise. For 
purposes of this section “access” includes being provided with the necessary 
password, encryption code, decryption code, software, or hardware and any other 
means required to enable comprehension of computerised data.71 
The ambiguity in processes and measures used by NITA-U in granting licences to service 
providers, maintenance of the established data base, and arbitrary investigative powers pose a 
risk of violation of the fundamental human rights of citizens.72 
3.15 Computer Misuse Act 
The Computer Misuse Act (CMA) penalises unauthorised access to computer programmes and 
data, unauthorised modification of computer material, and unauthorised use of interception of 
computer programmes.73 The law prescribes jail terms of 10-15 years for the various offences 
contained in the Act.74 The gravity of these sanctions has an unnerving effect on the enjoyment 
68 Amnesty International (2010) at 29. 
69 Amnesty International (2010) at 30 & 31. 
70 See Section 22 of the ESA. 
71 See Section 88 of the ESA. 
72 UN Special Rapporteur (2013) para 47. 
73 See Section 5 of the CMA. 
74 See Sections 5, 7, 15, 19, 21, 24, 25 & 26 of the CMA. 
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of internet freedoms. Section 18 of the CMA penalises unauthorised disclosure of information 
thus: 
any person who accesses any electronic data, record, book, register, 
correspondence, information, document or any other material is bound to keep the 
said information secret and protected from third parties. 
This provision curtails enjoyment of freedom of expression and opinion. It hinders free 
dissemination of information and imparting of opinions, as required under regional and 
international law. 
Section 9 of the CMA provides that: 
an investigative officer may apply to court for an order for the expeditious preservation of data 
that has been stored or processed by means of a computer system or any other information and 
communication technologies, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that such data is 
vulnerable to loss or modification. 
The officer only has to prove the existence of reasonable grounds of likely loss or modification 
of the data in question. The evidential burden on the investigative officer is far below the 
required standards. The expeditious preservation order remains in force until the investigations 
into the offence are concluded or, where prosecution is instituted, until the final determination 
of the case, or until such time as the court deems fit or directs.75 
The CMA is silent on the standard of proof required in an application for an expeditious 
preservation order. The “reasonable” ground test is an insufficient test to be applied across all 
crimes listed in the Act. It poses a great risk of a preservation order being issued on the basis of 
mere suspicions, which risks violation of the right to privacy. The law does not provide a 
remedy to a victim of ill-considered preservation orders. Thus, the injustice likely to be suffered 
by the victim will go uncured. This breeds an imprudent culture of using state agencies for 
promoting private or third-party interests at the expense of fundamental human rights. 
Section 10 of the CMA authorises investigative officers to apply to a competent court for 
a disclosure order in respect of preserved data. The order so obtained applies to all service 
providers and modes involved in the transmission of the data. Section 11 of the CMA allows 
that where the investigation or prosecution of a crime under the Act necessitates obtaining 
75 See Section 9(3) of the CMA. 
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information in a person’s control, the investigating officer may apply for a court order 
compelling said person to disclose the information within his knowledge. The court is bound by 
the requests listed in the application for the order. This system negates judicial impartiality and 
independence as it amounts to an attack upon judicial discretion in the trial procedure. Further, 
the provision creates an opportunity for the abuse of court process by the investigative officers. 
Section 28(2) of the CMA provides that: 
an authorised officer may seize any computer system or take any samples or copies of 
applications of data that is concerned in or is on reasonable grounds believed to be concerned in 
the commission of an offence, whether within Uganda or elsewhere. 
It bears noting that the Act does not explain what amounts to “reasonable grounds" with 
regard to the above provision. The information sought often may not be proportional to the 
crime being investigated or prosecuted. The provisos under the CMA are shy of personal 
privacy guarantees as software and devices used are interconnected with the service provider’s 
cyber network over which the victim lacks access and control. These provisions have had far-
reaching effects on the enjoyment of cyber space. This is because state agencies and private 
institutions control and manage personal data in disregard of the fundamental rights and 
interests of the people. 
In addition, the CMA gives broad and unclear powers to police officers regarding search 
and seizure of data or devices, based on suspicion of a potential perpetrator’s plan to commit a 
computer-related offence under the Act. Section 28 of the CMA confers jurisdiction upon 
Magistrates’ Courts, upon demonstration of reasonable grounds by a police officer that crime is 
about to be committed in any premises, to grant a search and seizure warrant. The police 
officer may use reasonable force in execution of the search warrant. Section 28(9) of the CMA 
describes premises which may be searched as: “Any land, building, movable structure, vehicle, 
vessel, air craft and hover craft.” 
Seizure extends to materials such as computer hardware, software and copies of 
computer-generated data which, on reasonable assessment, are believed to be or actually are 
connected to the investigation or prosecution of a given offence.76 The evidential burden is 
76 See Section 28(2) of the CMA. 
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weak as it hinges on proof of existence of reasonable grounds. The Act is silent on what 
amounts to “reasonable grounds”. This trend creates a risk of abuse of fundamental human 
rights since the Act leaves the determination of “reasonableness” to the personal assessment 
of criminal justice officers. 
Therefore, it may be concluded rightly that unchallenged, undefined and ambiguous 
authority conferred upon security operatives suggests a likely use of a subjective test for the 
granting of court orders under the Act, which poses a risk of curtailing enjoyment of internet 
freedoms. The ability to access personal data, especially by security agencies, largely is 
unchallenged.77 
3.16 Electronic Transactions Act 
This Act regulates the use, security, facilitation and regulation of electronic communications 
and transactions. The Act exonerates service providers from civil or criminal liability regarding 
third-party data in the form of electronic records to which they merely provide access.78 
However, for one to rely on this “immunity”, the liability should be founded upon the making, 
publication, dissemination or distribution of material or a statement in such material or the 
infringement of any rights subsisting in or in relation to the material in question.79 This 
protection is limited to non-contractual obligations.80 Therefore, a network service provider is 
criminally liable with regard to obligations arising from a licensing or regulatory framework 
established by law or an obligation imposed by law or a court to remove, block or deny access 
to any material or data. 
The Electronic Transactions Act relieves service providers of liability in specific 
circumstances. Section 30 provides that: 
where a service provider refers or links users to a data message containing an 
infringing data message or infringing activity, the service provider is not liable for 
damage incurred by the user if the service provider does not have actual knowledge 
that the data message or an activity relating to the data message is infringing the 
rights of the user; service provider is not aware of the facts or circumstances from 
77 UN Special Rapporteur (2013) paras 48 & 49. 
78 See Section 29 of the Electronic Transactions Act. 
79 See Section 29(1)(a) & (b) of the Electronic Transactions Act. 
80 See Section 29(2)(a) of the Electronic Transactions Act. 
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which the infringing activity or the infringing nature of the data message is 
apparent; service provider does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable 
to the infringing activity; and removes or disables access to the reference or link to 
the data message or activity within a reasonable time after being informed that the 
data message or the activity relating to the data message  infringes the rights of the 
user. 
Section 31 of the Act provides that notification of infringement to the service provider 
must be in writing. Whereas the Act provides for efforts by service providers to withdraw an 
unlawful data message, it is silent about reference to courts of law for an order to have the 
data deleted from the system. The Act also does not spell out procedures to be undertaken by 
the service provider prior to withdrawal of an unlawful data message. The meaning of the 
concept of “unlawful data” for purposes of Section 31 is not explained in the statute. This 
creates an avenue for violation of the right to privacy, especially by third parties who may 
exploit this gap in the law. 
Section 32 of the Act suggests that monitoring data transmitted or stored or making 
inquiries regarding an unlawful activity are discretionary for the service providers. The Act 
obligates the Minister, in liaison with NITA-U, to establish and supervise procedures for 
reporting unlawful transactions or dissemination of illegal information to competent state 
agencies.81 However, there is no statutory instrument or policy guide relating to disclosure of 
illegal activities to public authorities by service providers. 
This widens the existing enforcement gap, as such provisions create a dilemma among 
law enforcement officers. The Electronic Transactions Act does not provide remedies for 
potential victims of unlawful interference with their internet freedom in the process of 
transmission of data between the service providers and the public authorities. This contravenes 
the accepted regional and international standards which require states parties to promote and 
respect fundamental human rights, particularly the right to privacy and the freedoms of 
expression and opinion. 
81 See Section 36 of the Electronic Transactions Act. 
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3.17 Uganda Communications Act 
The Uganda Communications Act (UCA) of 2013 regulates the communications system in 
Uganda. Section 4 of the UCA establishes the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC). The 
Commission is obligated to: 
Implement the objectives of the Act; monitor, inspect, review, licence, supervise, control and 
regulate communications services; to conduct or authorise any person to conduct technical 
evaluations relating to communications services; to coordinate and collaborate with the 
relevant national and international organisations in matters relating to communications; to set 
national standards and ensure compliance with national and international communications 
services and equipment; to improve communications services generally and to ensure equitable 
distribution of services throughout the country; to promote competition, including the 
protection of operators from acts and practices of other operators that are damaging to 
competition, and to facilitate the entry into market of new and modern systems and services; to 
advise government on communications policies and legislative measures in respect of providing 
and operating communications services; to regulate interconnection and access systems 
between operators and users of telecommunications services; to set standards, monitor and 
enforce compliance relating to content; to represent Uganda’s communications sector at 
national and international fora and organisations relating to its functions and to coordinate the 
participation of any interested groups; and carry out any other functions that is related to the 
functions of the commission.82 
Section 8 of the UCA provides for the independence of the Commission in the discharge 
of its lawful duties. However, the Minister may issue policies, guidelines and codes for the UCC 
necessary for performance of its mandate.83 The UCA bestows broad and unfettered authority 
on the Commission in the performance of its obligations. These unchallengeable powers can be 
abused and have been abused to the detriment of the enjoyment of internet freedoms as, for 
example, in the establishment and maintenance of social media and communication 
interception monitoring centres in exercise of the authority conferred upon the Commission by 
RICA and the UCA. 
These centres have been used to promote the political interests of the current political 
regime by allowing information gathering for political persecution. The reports generated by 
these centres also resulted in the state imposing a social media tax, which is a prerequisite for a 
person to access social media and search engines such as Google. The statute contains no 
procedures and mechanisms for the handling of the personal data to which the officers at these 
82 See Section 5 of the UCA. 
83 See Section 7 of the UCA. 
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centres have access. This creates susceptibility to unlawful access of personal data by a third 
party. It amounts to a gross violation of the right to privacy and freedom of expression 
protected by international statutes, such as the ICCPR, which Uganda has signed or ratified. 
3.18 Anti-Pornography Act 
The Anti-Pornography Act (APA) criminalises all acts related to pornography. It was enacted in 
2014. Section 13 of the Act provides that: 
a person shall not produce, traffic in, publish, broadcast, procure, import, export, sell or abet 
any form of pornography. 
A crime under the APA attracts a maximum jail sentence of 10 years or a fine not exceeding 500 
currency points.84 Child pornography is criminalised in Section 14 and attracts a jail sentence of 
15 years or a fine not exceeding 50 currency points. The Pornography Control Committee is 
charged with the duty of implementing the Act. Pornography is defined as: 
any representation through publication, exhibition, cinematography, indecent show, 
information technology or by whatever means, of a person engaged in real or 
stimulated explicit sexual activities or the representation of the sexual parts of a 
person for primarily sexual excitement.85 
The APA adopts an extreme approach to combating pornography. This means that all modes of 
pornography are prohibited, including both practical operations and the use of media. 
According to the Unwanted Witness Report of 2014, the approach adopted by the APA in 
defining “pornography” is imprecise. It hinders media houses and individuals from knowing 
what actually amounts to pornography.86 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy 
and Freedom of Expression posits that states are required only to criminalise child 
pornography;87 arbitrary use of criminal sanctions to curtail enjoyment of internet freedoms is 
unjustified. 
The APA suggests heavy punishments for all pornography offences. The Act attempts to 
criminalise all forms of pornography, which violates freedom of expression as it hinders an 
84 See Section 13(2) of the APA. 
85 See Section 2 of the APA. 
86 UN Special Rapporteur (2012) paras 34 & 35. 
87 UN Special Rapporteur (2012) para 32. 
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individual’s opportunity to seek or share information that may be viewed as pornographic. The 
determination of the scope of pornographic substance lies with the authorities, and it is not 
clearly described in the statute. Whereas the anti-pornography campaign has moral support, 
the fundamental human rights of other people should be tolerated. There is a need for 
tolerance in a society built on unity in diversity. 
Section 3 of the Act provides for the establishment of the Pornography Control 
Committee. Section 24 requires the Committee to establish and maintain a database of those 
prosecuted for or convicted of offences under the Act. The details to be captured in the system 
include the name of the person, the punishment, the offence and the date of conviction. This is 
an infringement of the right to privacy of an individual. Pornography is categorised as one’s 
private affairs and thus should not be the target of unlawful interception or interference. 
Commentators on section 24 of the APA point to the need for using the “shame them” theory 
to deter criminality.88 
Section 15 of the APA vests jurisdiction in the courts to grant arrest, search and seizure 
warrants against a person suspected of being in possession of pornographic material or 
performing an act or an event with a pornographic connotation. The section provides that:  
where information is brought to the of the court that there exists in premises, an object or 
material containing pornography or an act or event of a pornographic nature, the court shall 
issue a warrant for the seizure of the object or material and for the arrest of the person 
promoting the material or object. An authorised person in possession of a search warrant issued 
by the court may enter any premises and inspect any object or material or gadget for the 
purpose of giving effect to this Act. A person who obstructs an authorised person in the carrying 
out of any of the function under this section commits an offence and is liable, on conviction, to a 
fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty currency points or imprisonment not exceeding 5 years 
or both. 
Authorised officers are likely to exploit this deficit to access a person’s devices or data for 
private or third-party benefit.89 The gap may be utilised also to instal communication 
surveillance software or gadgets in the seized devices. The Act provides unclear procedures and 
mechanisms for handling the seized devices or materials. This creates an opportunity for 
88 UN Special Rapporteur (2012) paras 33 & 34. 
89 UN Special Rapporteur (2011) para 81. 
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alteration or modification of an individual’s cyber system or network to his or her detriment. It 
amounts to suppression of the right to privacy and freedom of expression. 
The APA imposes criminal liability upon internet service providers who, by failing to use 
or enforce measures established by the Pornography Control Committee, authorise uploading 
or downloading any pornographic material through their service or links. The APA stipulates a 
jail sentence of five years or a fine not exceeding 250 currency points for one convicted of an 
offence under section 17. With respect to firms, the court may direct termination of their 
business.90 
3.19 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the various regional and international standards regarding 
protection of the right to privacy and freedom of expression and opinion. States parties are 
urged to guarantee internet freedoms. However, enjoyment of internet freedoms is not 
absolute. Limitations upon these rights should be activated only upon fulfilment of the three-
fold test contained in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR and other related regional and international 
instruments, such as the ACHR, ECFR and ACHPR. 
The chapter also presented a critique of the cyber law of Uganda in relation to the 
established regional and international standards. This law largely falls short of these standards 
with respect to the enjoyment of internet freedoms. The discussion has identified gaps in the 
cyber law regime of Uganda. These gaps pertain to ambiguous provisions, undefined key 
concepts, such as the “national interest”, and unfettered powers conferred on security agencies 
and other law enforcement units, which encourage human rights violations. 
 
 
 
90 See Section 17(2) of the APA. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
4.1 Conclusion 
This research paper has criticised the cyber-related law of Uganda against the regional and 
international standards regarding the right to privacy and freedom of expression. Uganda has 
ratified instruments containing these standards, such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda guarantees the right to privacy and 
freedom of opinion, expression and assembly.1 However, the study reveals a trend of violation 
of these rights by private and public institutions. A greater percentage of these violations are by 
state security agencies, such as the Uganda Police, Internal Security Organisation and 
Communications Surveillance Monitoring Centre under the guise of protecting an undefined 
national interest. 
The cyber security phenomenon is of global concern and crucial in the enjoyment of 
computer-related freedoms. The research asserts that technological development is a dynamic 
aspect that needs to be protected at all times. This involves protection from illegal or unlawful 
interference with an individual’s reputation, integrity, family, correspondence and 
confidentiality. The research established that the existing computer-related laws of Uganda are 
contradictory. 
There is a global consesus that states parties should guarantee the enjoyment of the 
right to privacy and of freedom of expression. This may be inferred from the various regional 
and international instruments, commentaries, reports and research papers by distinguished 
academicians, writers and UN Special Rapporteurs on the right to privacy and freedom of 
expression. It is worth noting that the right to privacy and freedom of expression are 
interwoven with other fundamental human rights, such as the rights to life, education and 
1 See Articles 26 & 27 of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda. 
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health. The right to privacy and freedom of expression are therefore crucial for human 
development and should be protected at all times. It is agreed widely also that these rights are 
not absolute and can be subject to limitations. International law suggests that restrictions upon 
enjoyment of the right to privacy and freedom of opinion should be: 
• clearly defined and prescribed under the law of the state party; 
• necessary for protection of state security, public order, public health, morals, and other  
people’s rights and freedoms; and 
• able to satisfy the principle of proportionality.2 
The research has highlighted gaps in the regional, international and Ugandan cyber-
related framework regarding the enjoyment of cyber freedom. Worse still, computer-related 
laws in Uganda fall short of the established regional and international standards for the 
protection and regulation of the right to “internet freedom”. This problem is aggravated by a 
widespread ignorance of internet freedoms among the Ugandan population.3 People generally 
are unaware of cyber-related law, avenues through which to pursue their rights when violated, 
and the procedure to be followed to maximise enjoyment of their internet freedoms. The 
lacunae disclosed by this research include the following: 
• ambigous provisions relating to the regulation of cyber space and cyber sytems in 
Uganda; 
• application of the “reasonable ground” test in a rather subjective manner, which creates 
room for violation of fundamental rights and abuse of functions by state officials; 
• key concepts — such as “national security” — in computer-related law are undefined, 
leading to their frequent misuse to justify restrictions upon internet freedoms; 
• lack of credible, transparent checks and balance mechanisms in the law governing 
Uganda’s enforcement agencies; 
• the absence from the existing legal framework of remedies for victims of violations of 
the right to privacy and freedom of expression; 
2 UN Special Rapporteur (2013) paras 24, 25 & 27. 
3 Mayambala (2016) at 9. 
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• the hortatory nature of the majority of the provisions in regional and international 
instruments related to safeguarding of the right to privacy and freedom of opinion; 
• certain of the computer-related laws in Uganda require establishment and maintenance 
of databases of personal details of Ugandans by various agencies, such as 
telecommunications companies and monitoring centres; 
• statutes such as the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act, the Uganda 
Communications Act and the Anti-Terrorism Act confer unfettered authority upon 
officials, which authority often has been used to curtail enjoyment of internet freedom 
(as, for example, in the social media shutdown during the 2016 Presidential Elections);4 
and 
• the Anti-Pornography Act, in taking an extreme approach and criminalising all acts of 
pornography, curtails enjoyment of freedom of expression and opinion. 
4.2 Recommendations 
4.2.1 Amendment of Laws 
This recommendation is premised on the need to bridge the gaps disclosed by this study. The 
amendments are necessary at national, regional and international level in order to create an 
environment for the full enjoyment of cyber freedoms. The regional and international 
instruments ought to be amended to include mostly mandatory provisions regarding the 
guarantee, observation and regulation of the right to privacy and the freedoms of opinion, 
expression and information. 
Other key areas to be addressed by amendments include: constitutional guarantees for 
victims of unlawful cyber attacks or communication intereptions; internal checks for monitoring 
and surveillance agencies; clear definitions and scope of fundamental rights; transparent 
procedures in obtaining and handling of personal data by private and public institutions; 
prevention of the use of anonymous identification tags on internet-related media; and the 
4 Maverick (2016) at 14. 
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adoption of an objective test in the granting of court orders pertaining to implementation of 
cyber-related law. 
4.2.2 Creation, Maintenance and Facilitation of Specialised Units at Regional and 
International Level 
Specialised units should be created by the regional and international institutions — such as the 
AU, ECOWAS, SADC, the EU, and the UN — mandated to monitor implementation of regional 
and international instruments by the states parties. This is premised on the role played by these 
institutions in standard setting regarding the protection of fundamental human rights. Non-
compliant states ought to be sanctioned. These sanctions may take the form of travel bans 
upon officials indicted for or convicted of violation of fundamental human rights. The efforts of 
the specialised units will aid the transformation from “paper” law to practice. 
At the national level, Uganda should establsih and maintain insitutions which safegaurd 
internet freedom. These institutions should be made accessible to the victims of cyber attacks 
or infringement of internent freedoms. All countries should embrace international co-operation 
to cater for the dynamics in the information technology sector. 
4.2.3 Research and Awareness Creation 
This can be done through organising or facilitating cyber-related training, seminars, 
conferences, innovations and research projects. Awareness creation should be conducted for all 
participants in the information and technology sector. This willl help to lessen the existing 
knowledge gap in the use of the cyber space. Further, enforcement deficit will be reduced, 
since there will be harmonious implementation of the law. Also, innovation encourages 
domestic creation of software which protects citizens from unlawful and unnecessary 
communication interception by foreign countries or their agencies (such as the CIA). 
The government should offer and facilitate specialised cyber training for security 
officers. The rationale is to cater for the gaps in detecting, investigating and prosecuting 
cybercrimes in Uganda. Recent trends indicate that cyber-related crimes are becoming 
rampant. In addition, the lapse in the criminal justice system has facilitated the commission of 
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conventional crimes such as murder, rape and terrorism with the aid of cyber tools. The 
growing reliance of courts upon electronic evidence in criminal cases justifies equipping security 
officers with cyber knowledge. 
4.2.4 Cyber Filtering 
The government should implement internet filtering services to prevent access to morally or 
socially harmful websites, especially those connected to pornography and terrorist agendas. 
The specialised units could do continous internet filtering also. However, the process of filtering 
should be tansparent, so as to prevent abuse of power by those mandated to conduct the cyber 
filtering. This is a preventive strategy against cyber attacks and the dissemination of harmful 
messages, propaganda and ideologies. It will prevent unnecessary and illegal interference with 
the personal data of Ugandans under cover of protecting state security, the national interest 
and the morals and values of the citizenry. 
4.2.5 Enhance Regulation of Cyber-Related Service Providers 
There is a need to regulate and monitor all categories of internet service providers, in both the 
public and private sectors. The purpose is to prevent them from being used as crime 
commission havens. It would involve enacting laws, implementing policies and establishing 
monitoring institutions to control access to prohibited internet sites and service providers. An 
example would be a law prohibiting children access to internet cafes, strip clubs and 
pornography shops. The use of unique identities which are traceable should be encouraged in 
order to enhance the investigation of cybercrime and the prosecution of perpetrators. 
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